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Abstract 
The international branding process of firms from developing countries is an area of scarce research. This 
paper is an attempt at filling this research gap by looking at the internationalization of emerging market 
companies from a branding perspective. Our aim is to explore the possible link between international 
branding decisions and international expansion of the firm through an in-depth study of Arçelik, the 
market leader in Turkey’s home appliances industry. Arçelik has adopted international expansion as a 
strategy for ten years, and it has aimed at branded growth in international markets for nearly that long. 
Through in-depth interviews with six senior company executives as well as two industry experts, we 
study the branding path adopted by a developing country firm. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last twenty years, Turkey has significantly increased its international trade in manufactured 
products. It is possible that this has been built on the basis of its lower labour costs compared with those 
of developed countries and the willingness of both Turkish national companies and multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) to invest in Turkey. While the basic evidence of Turkish trade development is clear, 
there has been only limited research on the business logic behind such growth, the reasons for choosing 
particular forms of expansion and the outcomes of such strategies at the present time for Turkish 
companies. 
 
In order to explore these issues, we have undertaken a preliminary study of the Turkish manufacture 
and export of home appliances companies. This paper tries to look at internationalization of emerging 
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market companies from a branding perspective. Our aim is to explore the possible link between 
international branding decisions and international expansion of companies from developing countries, an 
area of scarce research. We have chosen to study Arçelik, the market leader in Turkey’s home appliances 
industry,  because this is a company that has adopted international expansion as a strategy for ten years 
and branded growth in international markets nearly for that long.  
 
2. Literature review and research framework 
Although the literature in international business research is extensive and continues to grow (Werner, 
2002), Axinn and Matthyssens (2002) have argued that most theories on international strategies focus on 
explaining the behaviour of large firms from developed countries. They do not provide the same insights 
into the behaviour of firms from developing nations in the international market place. Given the 
emergence of companies from new international trading nations like India, China, and Turkey, the authors 
claim that it is imperative to look at new empirical evidence, rather than rely on existing theories of 
international trade. Equally, Buckley (2002) commented that the entry of developing countries as major 
players in the global economy may give new impetus to such research. This is echoed by other scholars’ 
calls for research into strategies for firms from emerging economies  (Peng, 2005).  
 
In view of the preliminary nature of the research developed in this paper, we have chosen to 
summarize the main strands of the literature in the table below. We make the assumption that readers will 
be broadly familiar with the relevant papers and focus on drawing out the main highlights. 
Table 1: Research framework – Strategic issues 
 
Strategic issues Some references 
International business expansion Dunning and Lundan 2008, Werner 2002; Axinn and Matthysens 2002; Buckley 
2002, Johanson and Vahlne 1977 
Global strategy and related issues in regional 
strategy 
Levitt, 1983; Douglas and Wind, 1987; Ghoshal, 1987; Yip and Coundouriotis, 
1991; Dunning 1993; Dunning 1995; Ghemawat and Ghadar, 2000; Ghemawat 
2003; Rugman and Verbeke 2003a, Rugman and Verbeke 2003b  
Turkish international strategy – including 
routes to development 
Taylan and SarÕ 2008, Bonaglia & Goldstein, 2007; ÇakÕr, 2004, KarabatÕ and 
Tan 2005; Root and Quelch 1997 
Strategic process  Reger and Huff, 1993; Pettigrew, 1992; Papadakis and Barwise, 1997; 
Chakravarthy and White, 2002 – who identify four routes 
Entry and expansion strategies of MNEs Dunning and Lundan 2008, Delios and Henisz 2003,  Forsgren 2002, Bartlett and 
Ghoshal 1989, Doz et al 2001 
Company resource management – international 
decisions and expansion 
Doz, 1986; Ohmae, 1982; Doz and Prahalad, 1991; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Murtha et al 1998; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2002; Lynch 2008 
 
 
While international expansion represents opportunity for firms from emerging markets, it also presents 
significant challenges. These challenges come in the form of inexperience, lack of resources and 
capabilities, the market dominance of well-established rivals, and consumer loyalty to existing brands 
(For a discussion of the disadvantages faced by developing country multinational enterprises see for 
example Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). It is interesting, therefore, to explore how, given their relative 
Tanses Gülsoy et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 24 (2011) 1201–1217 1203
 
disadvantages, firms from emerging markets are able to compete successfully against their more 
established rivals in developed markets.  
 
Among the routes identified for international expansion for companies from developing countries, 
organic expansion is recognized to be slower and costlier than original equipment manufacturing, joint 
venturing or acquisitions (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). In home appliances, for example, brand loyalty is 
a very important competitive factor (Paba, 1986). Traditionally, the establishment of a new brand of white 
goods in an existing market has faced a formidable barrier in the form of costs of advertising and other 
selling costs (Baden-Fuller and Stopford, 1991). An additional obstacle for these companies is initial 
negative quality associations among potential clients due to the products’ country of origin. Negative 
country-of-origin effects lower consumer expectations of quality, and as a result, consumers are not 
willing to pay as much for products from developing countries (Magnusson et al., 2008).  
 
Branding issues are largely absent in the published studies of internationalization by emerging market 
firms (Fan, 2008; Wells, 2009). This paper attempts to fill in the gap by presenting preliminary findings 
from a research project that investigates the internationalization of Turkish firms (Gülsoy et al., 2009 and 
2010). We examine internationalization of one emerging market firm – the market leader Arçelik – from a 
branding perspective. We chose to study Arçelik because it has made international expansion part of its 
corporate strategy over a period of ten years and has expressly pursued branded growth in international 
markets nearly that long.  
 
Building global brands takes time, and one way of shortening the process of internationalization 
appears to be acquiring brands rather than building them organically (Liu and Buck, 2009). Acquiring 
brands also provides a solution to the problem of the negative country-of-origin effects. There are some 
exceptions, however, one of which is China’s Haier, which successfully established its brand name in 
developed markets through a combination of product innovation and market niching (Duysters et al., 
2009). One of the questions to explore therefore is whether latecomers rely on branding initially in their 
international expansion efforts.  
 
A model of international brand development (Cheng et al., 2005) suggests a stages approach, whereby 
a firm begins with the development of a strong brand in the home market, then utilizes OEM brands to 
expand and become familiar with international markets. Following this stage is a gradual decrease in 
OEM contracts and more concentration on international branding in the three global lead markets (the 
USA, Japan, and the EU), and finally the firm turns its focus to brand development in developing and 
under-developed countries. Another question that will be explored in this paper is whether Arçelik’s 
branding path bears similarities with the stages in the Cheng et al. (2005) model.   
 
3. Research method 
 
At this early stage in our research, we have taken an eclectic approach to the gathering of data. We 
have been more concerned to see where the strands of information might lead us than to address specific 
hypotheses. Our approach has therefore been to examine the existing trade and company data in Turkey 
from an international development perspective.  
 
In addition to undertaking a statistical analysis of the Turkish home appliances industry, we have also, 
on a historical basis, conducted seven face-to-face interviews over a period of two years in order to gain a 
historical and in-depth perspective on the trends in the industry. They were also undertaken to develop an 
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understanding of why various strategies were adopted. For reasons of confidentiality, we do not identify 
the individual managers and the senior industry representatives that we interviewed. However, we are 
confident that the insights offered by these senior Turkish figures throw new light on the international 
development strategies of the Turkish domestic appliance industry.  
 
Prior to the interviews, we identified the relevant senior executives and made appointments to see 
them. The seven interviews each lasted one-and-a-half to two hours. Five interviews were tape-recorded, 
and two interviews were documented by written notes. For the tape-recorded interviews we hold the full 
evidence and have used this in the research material after presenting the industry data.  
 
The main data sources have been developed under the guidance of the Turkish Statistics Institute 
(TÜøK 2010a, 2010b),  the Export Promotion Center of Turkey øGEME (Esen, 2009), the State Planning 
Organisation of Turkey DPT (Demir, 2001), and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (Çeúmecio÷lu, 
2001). We have drawn heavily on these sources in our initial examination of the issues. However, some 
of this data has been summarised in reports prepared by the Turkish government and other official 
organizations and may therefore be subject to the opinions of those tasked with drawing up reports on 
Turkish international performance. To ensure that our data is accurate and not subject to interpretation 
bias, we have used the raw data from the relevant Turkish government offices in the compilation of our 
research rather than rely solely on the finished reports. 
 
In addition to the overall data, we have examined in depth the individual product areas. However, for 
reasons of space, we are not presenting that data in this paper. The researchers interested in those details 
may contact the authors for further information.  
 
Initially we had some difficulty with the Turkish statistical data, but we have now resolved these 
problems. We are confident that our basic research information provides an adequate picture of the state 
of home appliances production and international trade up to 2010.  
 
In addition to Turkish government official statistics, we have used the business press, company 
document analysis, and archive research to develop as full a picture as possible at this stage of the Turkish 
home appliances industry, its role and strategies in international trade development.  
 
4. Research results 
 
We present our research results in two parts. First, we outline the industry data, especially with regard 
to international expansion. Second, we present our interview evidence to explore the branding decisions 
of Turkey’s leading home appliances company Arçelik.  
 
4.1. Turkey’s place in the world home appliances industry 
In 2009 the world trade for the major household appliances of refrigerators, washing machines, ovens, 
and dishwashers occurred at around 34.8 billion dollars (Please see the table below).  
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Table 2: Turkey’s place in world exports of home appliances, 2006-2010 
Turkey’s place in world exports of home appliances*, 2006-2010 
(Top 20 exporters) 
Unit : US Dollar thousand 
      
Exporters Exported value 
in 2006 
Exported value 
in 2007 
Exported value 
in 2008 
Exported value 
in 2009 
Exported value 
in 2010 
World 34.322.397 39.697.139 40.705.916 34.800.243   
China 6.173.356 7.566.759 8.333.675 7.816.132 10.067.960 
Germany 3.984.352 4.467.242 4.447.628 3.528.926 3.299.305 
Italy 4.565.179 4.915.661 4.757.490 3.260.558 3.153.564 
Mexico 1.675.799 1.632.245 2.228.166 2.908.969 3.205.395 
Turkey 1.778.112 2.203.577 2.289.049 2.218.836 2.378.993 
Republic of Korea 2.257.941 2.303.748 2.285.075 2.155.755 2.635.832 
Thailand 1.791.273 1.940.778 2.098.403 1.944.698 2.384.293 
Poland 1.328.608 1.791.621 1.725.821 1.734.177 2.169.982 
United States of America 1.586.772 1.738.996 1.576.831 1.288.630 1.386.830 
Sweden 601.536 789.750 745.926 646.318 691.992 
Hungary 484.320 646.304 650.706 528.565 493.040 
Spain 778.263 805.091 706.468 508.057 522.944 
Slovakia 411.232 484.043 532.983 481.603 435.616 
Belarus 377.986 453.550 497.263 398.664   
Slovenia 463.357 571.828 549.266 390.312 408.648 
France 455.114 522.658 466.008 338.747 278.851 
Malaysia 331.314 333.581 331.801 337.815   
Brazil 468.083 491.525 449.256 279.105 283.641 
Singapore 477.227 644.313 652.810 276.900 473.222 
Czech Republic 303.300 404.366 381.431 264.304 240.496 
* The products included above are refrigerators, washing machines, dishwashers, and ovens and cookers. The following codes have 
been used in constructing the above table: Refrigerators – 8418.10, 8418.21, 8418.29, 8418.30, 8418.40; Washing machines – 
8450.11, 8450.12, 8450.19; Dishwashers – 8422.11; Ovens and cookers - 7321.11, 7321.12, 7321.13, 7321.19, 8516.50. 
Note 1: Trade Map Sources : ITC calculations based on COMTRADE statistics. 
Note 2: The world aggregation represents the sum of reporting and non reporting countries.  
Source: Trade Map (2011). Retrieved from www.trademap.org on April 16, 2011.  
 
 
From 2005 through 2008 world exports of home appliances had grown by an average of 10.40%. 
However, in the global recession year of 2009 export value of home appliances contracted by 14.51%.  
 
Turkey is the world’s fifth biggest exporter of home appliances in the major categories of refrigerators, 
washing machines, dishwashers, and ovens and cookers. For individual product categories, as of 2009, 
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Turkey is the world’s fourth biggest exporter of refrigerators (6.67%) and washing machines (7.62%), 
fifth biggest exporter of dishwashers (8.81%), and eighth biggest exporter of ovens and cookers (3.12%).  
 
 
4.2. Beginnings of international expansion 
The Turkish home appliances industry has had its beginnings in the late 1950s. The fÕrst washing 
machine was produced in 1959 by Arçelik, using a Belgian license, and the first refrigerator was again 
produced by the same company in 1960, assembling the parts supplied by an Isreali company (Bu÷ra, 
2000: 71).  
 
Until the 1980s the industry’s development was arrested by a variety of factors: As Turkish industry 
was protected by import tariffs and quotas, there was little foreign competition to encourage growth, 
which was also hampered by dearth of qualified personnel, lack of high technology, and the low 
purchasing power of the consumer (Çeúmecio÷lu, 2001: 6).  
 
Following the introduction of a major stabilization program in January of 1980, aimed at curbing 
inflation, overcoming the scarcities that hindered production, and reducing the foreign trade deficit 
through the promotion of exports and trade liberalization (Aktan, 1997: 174), the industry entered a 
period of rapid growth and several foreign companies began investing in the Turkish market. It was 
during this period, for instance, that the German company BSH Bosch Siemens Hausgeräte was founded 
in the Turkish market, in 1992 (BSH plans new dishwasher plant,” 2006), and again it was during this 
period, in 1994, that the Italian company Indesit established its first production plant here (“Indesit 
confident in Turkey,” 2010). The entry of foreign competitors increased competition. In the mid-1980s 
the industry speeded up its efforts to modernize both its product range and its technologies (Özbek, 2001: 
5). The end result was the availability of better quality product choices for the consumer (Çeúmecio÷lu, 
2001: 6).  
 
Before the introduction of the 1980 stabilization program, the Turkish home appliances industry 
engaged in limited exportation. In 1980, for instance, Turkey’s exports for refrigerators, washing 
machines, and dishwashers totalled 7 million dollars (TÜøK, 2010a), and the number of units exported 
accounted for a miniscule fraction of production. In 1980, for instance, the share of refrigerator 
production exported was a mere 5.5%. Less than 1% of the washing machines manufactured were 
exported that same year, and only two dishwashers were exported. (No export figures are available for 
ovens and cookers for 1980.) Protected by tariffs and customs duties, Turkey’s manufacturers of home 
appliances appeared content to manufacture mainly for the home market, which, with its young 
population, continued to grow. This is in sharp contrast to the situation today where more than half of all 
production is exported, and exports of the four major categories of home appliances account for nearly 
2% of Turkey’s entire exports in value.  
 
In the early 1980s the biggest export markets were Iran, Iraq, and Jordan (TÜøK, 2010b). Following 
the establishment of the stabilization program, policies of export incentives helped the Turkish home 
appliances manufacturers take a big leap in their export-oriented efforts. Between 1985 and 1986, two 
years after the import regime had been liberalized, import value of home appliances for the four major 
product groups increased by 60% from 2.9 million dollars to 4.8 million dollars. Exports from 1985 to 
1986, on the other hand, recorded an even more impressive increase, climbing from 3.5 million dollars to 
8.6 million dollars – increasing by 148%. Within the three years between 1986 and 1988, to take another 
example, Turkey’s home appliances exports for the four main product categories of refrigerators, washing 
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machines, dishwashers, and ovens and cookers increased from 8.6 million dollars nearly fivefold to 41.8 
million dollars (TÜøK, 2010b).  
 
The majority of early home appliances exports were headed to the countries of the Middle East, Libya, 
Iraq, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus notable among them. In 1989, for instance, Iraq 
accounted for 33.91% of Turkey’s washing machine exports by value and 17.73% of oven and cooker 
exports. More than one-third of refrigerator exports went to Libya that year, and 70.77% of dishwasher 
exports were bought by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.  
 
Table 3: Turkey’s foreign trade in major household appliances, 1989-2009 
Turkey’s foreign trade in home appliancesa, 1989-2009 
 Exports (Units)  Exports  
(USD) 
Year-on-
year export 
growth by 
value 
(%) 
Imports 
(Units)  
Imports  
(USD) 
Year-on-year 
import growth 
by value 
(%) 
1989 454.254 30.850.237  18.710 7.967.073  
1990 484.715 34.615.679 12,21 133.136 47.412.066 495,10 
1991 643.641 49.120.291 41,90 206.602 59.982.738 26,51 
1992 1.162.241 76.177.129 55,08 176.603 50.356.267 -16,05 
1993 1.732.887 99.743.232 30,94 239.353 83.247.587 65,32 
1994 1.838.765 128.524.767 28,86 154.198 50.699.624 -39,10 
1995 2.324.178 195.904.946 52,43 215.002 61.986.651 22,26 
1996 1.827.630 185.382.878 -5,37 508.794 141.894.044 128,91 
1997 2.341.727 228.463.840 23,24 617.137 224.411.033 58,15 
1998 2.668.929 250.493.253 9,64 964.174 261.100.157 16,35 
1999 2.805.633 286.128.164 14,23 754.138 182.514.030 -30,10 
2000 3.463.685 305.021.768 6,60 915.753 195.532.875 7,13 
2001 4.153.120 372.760.843 22,21 523.651 87.292.782 -55,36 
2002 6.091.529 605.558.239 62,45 462.394 70.056.286 -19,75 
2003 8.327.252 970.805.390 60,32 523.819 93.805.090 33,90 
2004 9.409.051 1.261.470.029 29,94 897.773 128.108.911 36,57 
2005 10.738.311 1.484.944.611 17,72 963.503 128.724.597 0,48 
2006 12.725.895 1.785.465.025 20,24 1.260.467 164.686.875 27,94 
2007 13.163.592 1.993.267.958 11,64 1.467.269 165.245.764 0,34 
2008 13.237.224 2.151.077.039 7,92 1.510.667 199.683.020 20,84 
2009* 13.269.070 2.015.291.390 -6,31 1.025.247 151.700.213 -24,03 
aThe home appliance categories included are refrigerators, washing machines, dishwashers, and ovens and cookers. 
* Figures for 2009 are provisional. 
Source: TÜøK, 2010b. 
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Part of the reason for the choice of destination may have been logistics. Regarding refrigerators, the 
biggest export item in the home appliances category, noted an Arçelik executive: “As refrigerators are 
voluminous items, their transportation across long distances presented many insurmountable problems for 
us in those days,” (Mamulattan Markaya, 2001: 315).  
 
Another reason may have been the standards demanded in Western markets. “There was a more 
discriminating consumer in the West,” explained another Arçelik executive (Mamulattan Markaya, 2001: 
313), before adding that Arçelik managed to live up to this challenge also.  
 
Government initiatives may also have played a part in the choice of export market at this stage. As 
recounted by an Arçelik executive, in the early 1980s exportation was an activity spearheaded by the 
government: “A delegation of 400 to 500 people, including mainly high-level government officials and 
bureaucrats and some businesspeople, would go to a country, for instance Iran or Iraq, and first would 
engage in a number of official meetings, and then under the supervision of a committee called the “mixed 
economic committee” a series of protocols would be signed that would stipulate that Turkey would sell to 
the country in question so many quantities of certain goods and would buy in turn so many quantities of 
certain other goods. What was interesting about this was that in this exportation effort, our competitors 
were not the countries of the Far East or other countries, but companies from our own country, and we 
would have to share the export agreement with that competitor,” (Mamulattan Markaya, 2001: 313).  
 
Yet another factor may have been “psychic distance,” defined as “the factors preventing or disturbing 
firms learning about and understanding of a foreign environment” (Vahlne and Nordstrom, 1992: 3, as 
cited in Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 92). Hence, according to the model, firms in the early stages of 
internationalization would choose markets where the psychic distance would be smaller, but as their 
organizational learning and experience increased, they would increase resource commitment to foreign 
markets (Vahlne and Nordstrom, 1992: 3, as cited in Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 91).  
 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, the unification of East and West Germany, the increasing 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the regime changes in the former Eastern Bloc countries, demand 
for home appliances rose. Again, Turkish manufacturers appeared ready to take advantage of this 
opportunity. Within the year between 1990 and 1991, Turkey’s exports for the four major home 
appliances categories rose by 41.9% from 34.6 million dollars to 49.1 million dollars (TÜøK, 2010b). 
 
Turkey’s home appliances export boom continued unabated throughout the 1990s. In the ten-year 
period from 1990 through 1999 exports increased more than eight-fold in value, from 34.6 million dollars 
to 286 million dollars. This was all the more noteworthy considering that in 1996 Turkey had joined the 
Customs Union, which meant that Turkey’s manufacturers were no longer protected against foreign 
competitors.  In 1996 a considerable 39% of refrigerator production was exported. By 1999, 40% of the 
refrigerators manufactured in Turkey were being exported, in addition to 14% of the washing machines, 
30% of the dishwashers, and 73% of the ovens and cookers.  
 
The Customs Union that went into effect in 1996 signals an important turning point in Turkey’s 
foreign trade. The removal of protective barriers meant that Turkish goods would now be exposed to 
foreign competition from import brands. In fact, the Customs Union could be considered a litmus test of a 
brand’s competitiveness. One year before, a formidable competitor – Bosch Siemens Hausgeräte – bought 
Profilo, one of the two main competitors in the Turkish market of home appliances, increasing 
competition in the industry. In 1996 and 1997, while Turkey fulfilled its obligations arising from the 
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Customs Union, the European Union could not fulfill its own obligations for various reasons (Serin, 2001: 
310). Other factors that unfavorably affected Turkey’s exports in 1996 and 1997 were the economic 
recession in Europe and the war in former Yugoslavia, which very much hampered land transportation 
(Serin, 2001: 310), and these factors may have also contributed to the contraction in Turkey’s home 
appliances exports in 1996 (Please see Table 3). In the 1990s imports grew even faster than exports. Early 
elections in 1995 led to an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, which led to a steep climb in 
Turkey’s imports (Serin, 2001: 310). 
 
The Turkish home appliances industry continued to increase its exports with vigor throughout the 
2000s. Between the years 2000-2008 export volume expanded seven-fold. Also notable from Table 3 is 
that in recessionary years or in their immediate aftermath Turkey’s white goods manufacturers appear to 
have redoubled their efforts to sell to export markets – probably to compensate for the reduced home 
market sales (Please note the years 1995 and 2002, two years that immediately followed two recessionary 
years). 
 
Today more than half of Turkey’s total exports of home appliances are destined for European Union 
countries (TÜøK, 2010b). In fact, by the end of 2008, the inward stock of  foreign direct investment into 
the European Union by firms located in Southern countries accounted for about 3% of all FDI to the EU-
27, and it is heavily concentrated in a small set of countries, of which the ten largest investor countries 
include Turkey (Buckley et al., 2011, p. 42).  
 
5. Research evidence on Arçelik: The branding path 
 
Arçelik is the leading manufacturer in Turkey’s home appliances market with over a 50% market share 
(Arçelik Annual Report, 2008: 26). In fact, the company’s two main brands, Arçelik and Beko, have 
maintained a combined market share of around 50% for well over a decade (Ghemawat and Thomas, 
2008: 1). In 2008 the company produced nearly 10 million units and had sales of 5.27 billion dollars, 
making it the leading firm in Turkey’s consumer durables. Koç Holding, Turkey’s largest conglomerate, 
owns 40.5% of Arçelik; Burla and Teknosan control around 17.6%, other Koç companies hold another 
16.7%, and the remaining 25.2% are publicly traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (Arçelik Annual 
Report 2010: 17).  
 
Founded as Turkey’s first home appliances manufacturer in 1955 and enjoying the largest share of the 
home appliances market  in Turkey, Arçelik could perhaps be thought of as a company that did not need 
to expand beyond its home market. Apparently, so did Arçelik – as it did not seem to have engaged in a 
planned expansion effort until about the mid-1990s. Several factors then seem to have collaborated to 
accelerate the company’s internationalization process. Among them are the opening up of the home 
market to foreign competition post-Customs Union; recessions in the home market that severely 
contracted demand for home appliances; and the company’s increasing capabilities. Today Arçelik is 
Europe’s third largest manufacturer of home appliances (Koç Holding Annual Report, 2008: 25). In fact, 
the company has 11 production plants in four different countries, is active in 18 different countries, and 
offers its products and services to more than 100 countries (Arçelik Annual Report, 2009: 19, 37). 
Moreover, in the year 2009 an important landmark was achieved in the company’s internationalization 
venture: That year Arçelik’s international sales accounted for 52% of the company’s total sales (Arçelik 
Annual Report 2009).  
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What was the role of branding in the achievement of these results? We now use the evidence from our 
research interviews, labeled in chronological order as A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H [Full details are given at 
the end of the paper].  
 
5.1. Original equipment manufacturing vs. branding  
A company essentially has three choices when exporting to international markets: branding or no 
branding; creating vs acquiring; and single vs multiple brands (Onkvisit and Shaw, 1989, as cited in 
Hollensen, 2007).  
 
In 1988 Arçelik started OEM exporting to the US, in 1997 OEM exporting to Europe began. Even 
though Arçelik began its international expansion as an original equipment manufacturer, however, the 
company’s aim was branded growth from the beginning, notes one longtime-serving company executive 
(Respondent H). According to an account in the company’s corporate history, the first steps towards 
establishing the Beko brand in Europe were initiated in 1990 (Mamulattan Markaya, 2000, p. 320). 
Arçelik entered the UK market in 1990 by opening Beko UK there, and the products sold bore the Beko 
brand name. 
 
Initially undertaken to utilize excess capacity (Respondents E and H), original equipment 
manufacturing helped the company gain access to advanced production skills, which consequently led to 
the improvement of product quality and service.  
 
“We did not choose [to work as an OEM for] entry-level brands; we manufactured dishwashers for 
Whirlpool, for example. We learned know-how. We learned how to manufacture [to the demands of] an 
upper-level brand. We learned how to serve [that kind of a brand]. You learn their systems, you see their 
plants. We had the opportunity to learn of their quality systems. We saw our own deficiencies,” 
(Respondent H).  
 
By the 2000s, however, the limits of original equipment manufacturing had been reached. Indications 
of the company’s steering away from original equipment manufacturing appear in company annual 
reports.  “To be successful in international markets a company has to cultivate its own brands. In the long 
term, OEM-based growth is a price-oriented strategy and does not result in profitability and 
sustainability.” The preceding statement appeared in the Arçelik annual report of 2005 as a clear 
indication of the company’s future course regarding branded growth (p. 21). The intention to grow with 
own brands in international markets appeared again in the following year’s annual report (p. 24).  
 
“Whirlpool, Electrolux... we did original equipment manufacturing for all of the brands you can think 
of. ... We were looking at the balance sheet and not seeing any profit. This is the fate of OEM.... One year 
you are selling 100,000 units, the next year you can find your sales volume down to zero,” (Respondent 
G).  
 
Even though the costliness of branding was acknowledged, it was also recognized that unless a 
company develops its own brand, “you are doomed to extinction,” (Respondent G). Today in the 
international sales of the Koç Group of Companies, the share of OEM is estimated to be around 10-15%, 
and in the case of Arçelik around 5% (Respondent H). The annual reports of the company give the share 
of branded goods sales in international net consolidated sales at around 78% (Annual Report 2008, p. 27).  
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Nonetheless, Arçelik appears to give original equipment manufacturing due consideration under 
specific circumstances, for example, when it would make a strategic contribution to Arçelik (Respondent 
E). In new markets OEM appears to initiate the corporate reputation of Arçelik at the distribution channel 
level, on the understanding that those channels would be more receptive to the company when later it 
decided to introduce its own brands (Respondent E).  
 
5.2. Branding in developed markets vs. developing markets 
5.2.1. Developed markets: Challenges and advantages 
To a foreign brand the challenges represented by developed vs developing markets differ. According 
to another account in the Arçelik corporate history, creating a brand in Europe was a very difficult 
process involving “numerous” factors (Mamulattan Markaya, 2000, pp. 320-321). “The most important 
factor is time. First of all, penetration needs to increase so that the customer meets the brand, and 
gradually the brand image is formed,” (Mamulattan Markaya, 2000, p. 321).  
 
The gradual decrease of OEM contracts, by Arçelik’s own choice (Respondent H), and concentration 
on branded growth is predicated on capability upgrading through important investments in the past in 
research and development and technology (Mamulattan Markaya, 2000, p. 323). “Innovation creates a 
difference for your brand where the distribution channel is concerned,” (Respondent D). The importance 
of research and development and innovation is underlined for success in developed markets. In 2010 
Arçelik was a leader in patent applications in Turkey (Annual Report 2010, p. 36), and in 2008 it became 
the only Turkish company among the first 500 companies listed by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (Annual Report 2009, p. 41).   
 
“Winning customer satisfaction” was the first step towards creating an international brand, according 
to one account in the company’s corporate history (Mamulattan Markaya, 2000, p. 322).  
 
One respondent enumerates some of the problems encountered in European markets:  
 
“In Europe some markets had 40 different brands, some 80. Incredibly difficult! ... There were 
different channels of distribution: developed chain stores, hypermarkets, kitchen channels, wholesalers... 
Then there is the Turkish origin, and it’s negative!” (Respondent H).  
 
How did Arçelik overcome these obstacles?  
 
“Labeling our products with a ‘Made in Europe’ tag is not what we did. Instead, in our trade 
communications we used the fact that we were contract manufacturing for Europe’s biggest company. We 
were manufacturing for the most expensive brands,” (Respondent H).  
 
In a newspaper article announcing the company’s becoming the leading brand in a number of white 
goods categories in the UK in 2010, another senior Arçelik executive recalled downplaying the Turkish 
origin of the brand: “In our first years [in the UK] we did not launch Beko as a Turkish brand. Of course, 
it said ‘Made in Turkey’ on Beko, but we did not make a special effort to underline the fact,” (Munyar, 
2011, p. 8).   
 
Today, the company tries to counteract the possible negative effects of country of origin by 
emphasizing that it is an international brand sold in more than 100 countries (Respondent E). 
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Innovativeness is another way through which the company attempts to position the Beko brand (“Smart 
solutions to improve everyday life”).  
 
Another good decision appears to be that the company never targeted the lowest price position in the 
entry-level segments, but aimed at a level above (Respondent H). Today Arçelik aims at a mid-market 
positioning of the brand (Respondent H).  
 
Branding in developed markets appears to be an uphill battle. This is a battle that has to be won on 
several fronts. Explains Respondent H:  
 
“Our product is new. Everything we say about our product is true... We give very fast service. The 
European channel may bring in a product from China in three months, we are able to deliver some of our 
products in fifteen days. Flexible production planning, [effective] supply chain... It all begins with the 
design. Relations with side industries... I have seen no other factory where there is so much quality 
control. Our random controls are more stringent than those of our competitors. ... Turkey’s best 
engineers... Factory’s are young, modern. The servicing need is very low. Good design. The trade 
experiences this, the end consumer experiences this, the servicing companies in Europe experience this...”   
 
The company’s research and development investments appear to have paid off in terms of generating 
brand awareness. In advertising the company has adopted a trade promotion strategy until sufficient 
channel penetration is achieved before embarking on above-the-line advertising (Respondent E). Above-
the-line advertising is placed strategically in high-impact generating media such as the UK Premier 
League Football (Respondent H). The company also relies on international sports event sponsorships to 
generate brand awareness.  
 
Today in developed markets Arçelik appears to have the advantages of a complete product line, a 
quality product, and wide channel coverage (Respondent H). As testament to the company’s success, in 
2009 Arçelik managed to increase its market share in a contracting European market, and sales increased 
by 15%  (Arçelik Annual Report 2009: 8). 
 
5.2.2. Developing markets: Challenges and advantages 
 
In the markets of the Middle East, Africa, and the Turkic Republics, Arçelik appears to enjoy a strong 
brand reputation. Referring to the Turkic Republics, Respondent H explains:  
 
“The product was definitely better than those of the competitors, and it was also better than consumer 
expectations. In most of those markets there was no no-frost technology.  ... The Turkish market was 
more developed [compared to those markets at the time].” 
 
While in developed markets, the country-of-origin may have had a negative effect, in the Turkic 
Republics and the Middle East,  for example, it is a definite plus (Respondents E, G, and H). In fact, in 
the countries of the Middle East, if a product does not have the “Made in Turkey” label, “its chances of 
finding a customer are zero,” (Respondent G). In Iran and Iraq the Beko brand has its counterfeits. In the 
markets of the Middle East “the Turkey name commands respect, I can see the reputation of the Arçelik 
brand and of the Koç name,” (Respondent G).  
 
As awareness of global brands was low in the markets of Eastern Europe, Arçelik entered these 
markets on a par with its major competitors and could grow rapidly (Respondent D). The company 
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transferred its skills in establishing a distributorship network to the markets of Eastern Europe and the 
Turkic Republics, and this skill was also instrumental in achieving successful results (Respondents D and 
G). Another advantage enjoyed by Arçelik in developing markets is “knowing which stages those 
countries will be going through,” (Respondent D).  
 
In the large and “mostly empty” Russion market Arçelik opened up a production plant in order to 
increase consumer trust (Respondent H). 
 
“In developing countries you should set up your factory. ... The consumer is barely able to afford your 
product. It will either be a firsttime purchase or a replacement for the twenty-year-old appliance at home. 
What if the spare parts do not come? Well, the company’s plant is right here. Suddenly, the purchasing 
criteria change. In developed markets, on the other hand, consumer protection is so strong that the 
consumer has no such concerns,” (Respondent H).  
 
In developing markets the challenges came in the form of the institutional constraints such as the legal 
framework (Respondent G), protectionist import regimes, transportation costs, problems in banking 
transactions, and the necessity of training the after-sales personnel (Respondent A); as well as small 
markets and a myriad different product types (Respondent C).  
 
Especially the dearth of qualified personnel to service Arçelik products creates problems in terms of 
maintaining brand equity:  
 
“If you want to protect your brand, you have to provide the after-sales service as well. Training the 
people there is costly. [But] you make a commitment to the consumer when you put your brand on that 
[product],” (Respondent A).  
 
Today Arçelik is active in 13 countries of the Middle East, 19 countries of Africa, and all of the Turkic 
Republics (Respondent G). The company continues to increase its sales volume in these areas. In 2010 
consolidated net sales in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States rose by 18% and 
in Africa and the Middle East by 9% (Annual Report 2010, p. 12).  
 
5.3. Brand acquisitions and single vs. multiple brands 
Brand acquisitions Arçelik seems to have engaged in mainly to speed up the process of 
internationalization. Even though Arçelik managers recognize the importance of branding, they are also 
very much aware of the costliness of a strategy of branded growth (Respondents D and G). Especially 
after the economic recession of 2001, the senior management appears to have seen internationalization as 
imperative. Between 2002 and 2003 Arçelik bought Blomberg (a subsidiary of Brandt in Germany), 
Elektra Bregenz (Austria) with its brands Elektra Bregenz and Tirolia, the British home appliances brands 
Leisure (cookers) and Flavel (appliances and TV sets), and the Romanian refrigerator producer Arctic. In 
2004 the company made a joint acquisition of the Grundig brand of televisions with the British Alba Plc, 
with the remaining shares bought in 2007.  
 
After Arçelik bought these well-known brands, it made further investments in them. Arctic is the 
strongest brand in Romania with a market share of 30% (Annual Report 2010, p. 29). Upon purchasing 
the company and the brand, Arçelik immediately increased production capacity from 300,000 units to 1.1 
million units (Respondent D). A washing machine factory bought in China (Changzhou Casa-Shinco) in 
2006 was rapidly upgraded to bring it up to the standards of Arçelik (Respondent D). Blomberg and 
1214  Tanses Gülsoy et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 24 (2011) 1201–1217
 
Elektra Bregenz have increased their product ranges with innovative new additions (company annual 
reports).  
 
In the year 2000 Arçelik decided to use only the Beko brand in its international markets. In those 
markets where the company acquired well-established brands, it promotes Beko along with the acquired 
brand, thereby targeting multiple market segments.  
 
5.4. Restructuring the marketing organization 
To speed up the process of branding in international markets, Arçelik restructured its marketing 
organization in 2010. Now there are an assistant general manager of marketing and two directors of 
marketing reporting to the position, one responsible for the home market and the other for foreign 
markets. The centralized marketing organization is expected to give the company a new leap forward in 
international markets (Respondent E). Respondent H noted that in a recessionary period where everyone 
else was reducing the marketing budget, through such moves “we are increasing it.”  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This report summarizes the branding decisions taken by one emerging country multinational over the 
course of its internationalization venture.  
 
Arçelik has chosen the more difficult route of branding rather than original equipment manufacturing. 
While Arçelik management does not entirely dismiss the possibility of that mode of arrangement, it is 
clear from the interview evidence that OEM is not the company’s preferred course. Arçelik has employed 
licensing and original equipment manufacturing to bolster its organizational and technological capabilities 
at home before venturing abroad. The company has chosen international expansion for a number of 
reasons: to grow larger, to utilize excess capacity, to defend itself against the vicissitudes of the volatile 
home market demand, and to bolster its competitive position in the home market against multinational 
brands.  
 
The evidence suggests that even as early as 1989 Arçelik relied on branding while it was working as an 
OEM at the same time. In developed markets where the possibility of negative country-of-origin effects 
existed, the Turkish origin of the Beko brand was downplayed. After painstakingly building its Beko 
brand in Europe, the company embarked on a brand acquisition strategy to increase market share in 
developed countries where brand-building is especially difficult. Even in those markets, however, the 
company appears committed to building the Beko brand.  
 
One point raised by the interview evidence is whether Arçelik should continue working on an OEM 
basis even if in a limited fashion. Now that the company has a pretty well-established brand in Beko, 
Arçelik may afford to continue working as an OEM for selected customers. Otherwise, an OEM may risk 
losing the opportunity to develop its own brand internationally (Keegan & Green, 2005, as cited in Fan, 
2008: 310).  
 
Arçelik appears to have gone through several phases in its international expansion. After building a 
customer base at home, it has improved its product and service offerings through capability upgrading via 
licensing, joint venture agreements, and OEM contracts. Then it has chosen to expand into the European 
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Union partly for reasons of proximity, partly from a desire to operate in a stable institutional environment. 
Finally, the company turns its focus to brand development in developing countries. Consequently, 
Arçelik’s branding path bears some similarities to the stage model of international brand development 
suggested by Cheng et al. (2005). 
 
In conclusion, this is only a preliminary examination of one emerging market multinational’s branding 
decisions. More research is needed in this area to identify the key factors that influence international 
brand development. In the next stage of our research we are seeking a larger research sample of Turkish 
domestic appliance manufacturers to shed further light on that question.  
 
 
Note 
The respondents to the interviews conducted for this paper are indicated below with the following 
designations:  
 
Respondent A: Senior executive from Arçelik. The interview was conducted in April of 2009.  
Respondent B: Senior executive from an industry body. The interview was conducted in December of 
2009.  
Respondent C: Senior executive from an industry body. The interview was conducted in January of 2010.  
Respondent D: Senior executive from Arçelik. The interview was conducted in March of 2010.  
Respondent E: Senior executive from Arçelik. The interview was conducted in January of 2011 (at the 
same time as the interview with Respondent F).  
Respondent F: Senior executive from Arçelik. The interview was conducted in January of 2011 (at the 
same time as the interview with Respondent E).  
Respondent G: Senior executive from Arçelik. The interview was conducted in January of 2011.  
Respondent H:  Senior executive from Arçelik. The interview was conducted in February of 2011. 
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